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Recently,  there  has  been  an  increasing  interest  in  policy  mixes  in  innovation  studies.  While it  has  long
been  acknowledged  that  the stimulation  of  innovation  and technological  change  involves  different  types
of policy  instruments,  how  such  instruments  form  policy  mixes  has  only  recently  become  of  interest.
We  argue  that an area  in  which  policy  mixes  are particularly  important  is  the  ﬁeld of  sustainability
transitions.  Transitions  imply  not  only  the  development  of  disruptive  innovations  but  also  of policies
aiming  for wider  change  in socio-technical  systems.  We  propose  that  ideally  policy  mixes for  transitions
include  elements  of  ‘creative  destruction’,  involving  both  policies  aiming  for the  ‘creation’  of  new  and  for
‘destabilising’  the  old.  We  develop  a  novel  analytical  framework  including  the  two  policy mix  dimensions
(‘creation’  and  ‘destruction’)  by  broadening  the  technological  innovation  system  functions  approach,  and
speciﬁcally  by  expanding  the  concept  of  ‘motors  of innovation’  to  ‘motors  of creative  destruction’.  We  test
this framework  by analysing  ‘low  energy’  policy  mixes  in Finland  and  the  UK. We  ﬁnd  that  both  countries
have  diverse  policy  mixes  to support  energy  efﬁciency  and  reduce  energy  demand  with instruments  to
cover  all  functions  on the creation  side.  Despite  the  demonstrated  need  for such policies,  unsurprisingly,
destabilising  functions  are  addressed  by  fewer  policies,  but there  are  empirical  examples  of such  policies
in both  countries.  The  concept  of ‘motors  of  creative  destruction’  is  introduced  to  expand  innovation  and
technology  policy  debates  to go  beyond  policy  mixes  consisting  of  technology  push  and  demand  pull
instruments,  and  to consider  a wider  range  of policy  instruments  combined  in a  suitable  mix  which  may
contribute  to  sustainability  transitions.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).. Introduction
Recently, there has been increasing interest in the innovation
tudies literature in questions surrounding policy mixes. While it
as long been acknowledged that the stimulation of innovation and
echnological change can include a number of different types of pol-
cy instruments and that the most appropriate type of instrument
ight depend on the stage of the innovation process or the respec-
ive sector (Pavitt, 1984), the issue of how such instruments form
olicy mixes has only recently been highlighted as being of interest
o this community (Flanagan et al., 2011; Borrás and Edquist, 2013;
∗ Corresponding author at: SPRU-Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sus-
ex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9SL, UK.
E-mail addresses: p.kivimaa@sussex.ac.uk (P. Kivimaa), f.kern@sussex.ac.uk
F. Kern).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.09.008
048-7333/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uMagro and Wilson, 2013; Quitzow, 2015) as well as policy makers
from the European Commission (Nauwelaers et al., 2009).
We argue that policy mixes are particularly important in the
ﬁeld of sustainability transitions. This literature has received
increasing interest in the context of technology and innovation
studies and goes beyond single innovations, examining change at
the level of socio-technical systems (cf. Markard et al., 2012). Tran-
sitions in the form of systemic changes in current structures for
consumption and production are viewed as being of paramount
importance to reduce the overall environmental impacts of human
activities. Much of the literature focusses either on protective niche
spaces for innovations which might overturn incumbent regimes
(Smith and Raven, 2012) or on facilitating the emergence of tech-
nological innovation systems (e.g. Bergek et al., 2008). Recently,
attention has also been paid to the processes of destabilising incum-
bent regimes through “weakening reproduction of core regime
elements” that are seen as necessary to create “windows of oppor-
tunity” for the upscaling of niche innovations (Turnheim and
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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eels, 2012, 2013). In this context, major policy change has been
rgued to be important, because “it shapes both the direct sup-
ort for industries.  . . and economic frame conditions” (Turnheim
nd Geels, 2012, p. 46). Thus, transitions may  not only require the
evelopment of disruptive innovations but also of disruptive pol-
cy mixes aiming for systemic change (e.g. Kivimaa and Virkamäki,
014; Weber and Rohracher, 2012). This type of policy change is
ften, however, constrained by the political challenges of introduc-
ng more coherent policy mixes (Howlett and Rayner, 2007; Kern
nd Howlett, 2009).
Building on the seminal concept of creative destruction, pro-
osed by Joseph Schumpeter, and the recent concept of regime
estabilisation (Turnheim and Geels, 2012), we propose that pol-
cy mixes favourable to sustainability transitions need to involve
oth policies aiming for the ‘creation’ of new and for ‘destroying’
or withdrawing support for) the old. By making this distinction
e want to ease the identiﬁcation of elements potentially lacking in
xisting policy mixes from the perspective of transitions. Moreover,
he urgency of sustainability transitions requires explicit analyses
f active destabilisation, because solely relying on the emergence
nd growth of a variety of alternatives to replace incumbent sys-
ems will be too slow. We  conceive of these kinds of policy mixes
s not only comprising typical innovation and technology policies
ut all policies that potentially work in favour of transitions.
This paper extends the work on the functions of Technological
nnovation Systems (TIS) by proposing a novel conceptual frame-
ork for policy mixes for sustainability transitions, and introducing
t as “motors of creative destruction” building on and extending
uurs and Hekkert’s (2009) concept of “motors of innovation”. The
xtension addresses a previous critique of the TIS approach (e.g.
mith and Raven, 2012; Kern, 2015) that it does not pay enough
ttention to the regime level for analysing transitions. While the
dea of destabilising regimes may  be implicit in TIS through its
ntended key contribution to function as a tool for identifying sys-
em weaknesses preventing a speciﬁc TIS from developing (e.g.
acobsson and Bergek, 2011), the development of a new TIS does
ot automatically lead to ‘destruction’ in the dominant regime.
oreover, destabilisation can serve the upscaling of several TISs in
ifferent subsystems, not just a speciﬁc one. Therefore, we combine
ttention to supporting the development of speciﬁc niche innova-
ions and new technological innovation systems with attention to
egime destabilisation, and argue that policy mixes need to attend
o both processes in a mutually re-enforcing way. Empirical testing
f the framework is provided by examining policy mixes inﬂuenc-
ng low energy transitions in Finland and the UK. Both countries
ave made signiﬁcant efforts to promote energy efﬁciency but
rovide interesting contrasts in several ways (discussed later).
The next section reviews the literature before Section 3 turns to
he proposed analytical framework and the methodology. Section
 presents the empirical analysis followed by a discussion of the
ey insights in Section 5 and conclusions in Section 6.
. Innovation policy mixes and sustainability transitions
.1. Policy mixes
Recent interest in innovation policy mixes has been justiﬁed
n the grounds that real world policy contexts involve several
olicy instruments in different policy domains and with differ-
nt rationales, dispersed governance structures and many levels
f administration (Flanagan et al., 2011; Borrás and Edquist, 2013;
agro and Wilson, 2013; Quitzow, 2015). Many scholars use the
oncept of ‘policy mix’ similarly to Borrás and Edquist (2013, p.
514) who refer to ‘a set of different and complementary pol-
cy instruments to address the problems identiﬁed’ in a nationalolicy 45 (2016) 205–217
or regional innovation system. However, broader interpretations
have been suggested by Magro and Wilson (2013) and Rogge and
Reichardt (2013), adding to the mix  also policy goals and ratio-
nales as well as processes of policy making and implementation.
While we see merit in the broader concept of the policy mix, for
purposes of empirical illustration in this paper, we focus on what
Rogge and Reichardt (2013) would deﬁne as instrument mixes. We
do, however, extend from Borrás and Edquist in that we examine
policy mixes for transitions over several policy domains, not merely
‘classic’ innovation policy instruments. Analyses across domains
are important from the perspective of policy coherence and con-
sistency, as sub-optimal or even perverse outcomes of policies can
frequently be explained by clashing policies designed for different
purposes across different policy domains (e.g. Huttunen et al., 2014;
Nilsson et al., 2012).
Howlett and Rayner (2007) have explained the complexity of
policy mixes developing over time in non-innovation policy con-
texts. They deﬁne three kinds of policy mix  evolution: layering that
indicates new goals and instruments added on top of existing ones,
often leading to incoherent and inconsistent mixes; drift to imply
changed policy goals without altering the instruments, creating
inconsistency between them, and; conversion denoting change in
instruments without altering goals. A fourth type is introduced
by Kern and Howlett (2009) as replacement that fundamentally
restructures both goals and instruments in a conscious, coherent
and consistent manner. However, Howlett and Rayner (2013, p.
177) note that most existing policy mixes have developed through
“layering, or repeated bouts of policy conversion or policy drift”, often
resulting in inconsistent policy mixes, and that situations where
new consistent policy mixes are developed are rather rare. Simi-
larly, in the context of innovation studies, Flanagan et al. (2011)
have argued that policy mixes can at best be coordinated by a pro-
cess of mutual adjustment between a variety of actors and systems.
This means that there are no ‘optimal’ (Nauwelaers et al., 2009;
Borrás and Edquist, 2013; Quitzow, 2015) or even ‘good’ (Flanagan
et al., 2011) innovation policy mixes in a general sense.
Our contribution complements many recent studies on innova-
tion policy mixes (e.g. Flanagan et al., 2011; Borrás and Edquist,
2013; Rogge and Reichardt, 2013) that are predominantly concep-
tual (the exception being Quitzow, 2015), by applying the concept
of an innovation policy mix to an empirical context. We  also address
other shortcomings in this literature: the consideration of inno-
vation fairly narrowly in the context of R&D support, ﬁrms and
individual technologies (e.g. Nauwelaers et al., 2009; Rogge and
Reichardt, 2013; Quitzow, 2015) and the lack of attention to pol-
icy mixes fostering ‘directed’ transitions towards more sustainable
socio-technical systems. The need for such transitions is a cru-
cial policy challenge and an increasing focus of academic research,
reviewed below.
2.2. Sustainability transitions and innovation policy
Considerable recent literature on sustainability transitions has
emerged to study the transformation of socio-technical systems
(incl. technologies, infrastructures, institutions, industrial sectors,
user behaviours) towards environmental sustainability. The multi-
level perspective (MLP) has developed as a key meso-theory
to explain such processes (Markard et al., 2012). The principal
idea of the MLP  is that transitions come about through interac-
tions between three different levels: landscape (macro-economic
and macro-political trends, signiﬁcant environmental changes,
demographic trends, etc.), regime (the deep structure of the
socio-technical system involving alignment between technologies,
infrastructure, institutions, practices, behavioural patterns, mar-
kets, industry structures, etc.), and niches (spaces where various
technical, social and organisational innovations are created and
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et al., 2008; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011) as it gives a rather
comprehensive list of innovation-inducing processes that policies
can potentially address (Kivimaa and Virkamäki, 2014), and make
slight amendments inﬂuenced by the SNM literature.1 We  added
1 Positive externalities has been identiﬁed as one of the seven TIS components,P. Kivimaa, F. Kern / Rese
ested) (Geels, 2002, 2004, 2011; Geels and Schot, 2007). The MLP
osits that top-down landscape pressures and bottom-up develop-
ents of several emerging niches can lead to the destabilisation
f incumbent regimes offering opportunities for niches to break
hrough and overthrow the incumbent regime. Closely connected
o the MLP  (Rip and Kemp, 1998) and developing at the same
ime, the literature on Strategic Niche Management (SNM) has
merged as a call to extend technology policy to facilitate the
evelopment of technological niches through experimentation-
riented policy tools, potentially stimulating transitions towards
ew regimes (Kemp et al., 1998; Hoogma et al., 2002). Raven (2005)
as linked niche development and increased niche market size to
he instability of regimes.
A related theoretical trajectory is that of Technological Inno-
ations Systems (TIS), developed to study the emergence of new
echnologies and the formation of technology-speciﬁc innovation
ystems around them, and particularly to identify “system weak-
esses that should be tackled by public policy” (Jacobsson and
ergek, 2011, p. 46). Many recent TIS studies are focused on system
unctions that are deﬁned as processes inﬂuencing the develop-
ent of an innovation system around a particular technology
Suurs and Hekkert, 2009; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). The central
dea behind the TIS functions approach is that, through cumula-
ive causation, the different functions strengthen one another and
ogether lead to a positive, self-reinforcing dynamic (‘motors of
nnovation’) allowing a technology-speciﬁc innovation system to
evelop (Suurs and Hekkert, 2009). Suurs and Hekkert (2009) have
ound national policy to support mainly the ‘science and technol-
gy push’ motor and to have hampering effects on market and
ntrepreneurial motors. The motors are argued to enable the build-
p of TIS; they emerge over a long period of time and comprise a
road variety of activities (Suurs and Hekkert, 2009).
In comparison to MLP/SNM, little insight has been provided on
ow an emerging TIS can overturn incumbent regimes, a short-
oming pointed out by Markard and Truffer (2008) and Smith and
aven (2012). This is because the starting point for (many) TIS anal-
ses is the dynamics of a speciﬁc TIS, while sector or regime level
ynamics are backgrounded. Whereas the identiﬁcation of techno-
ogical innovation system weaknesses is described as a core concept
Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011), the wider sectoral system or regime
as rarely been explicitly addressed by the empirical TIS studies
ublished over the last couple of years. More importantly, as the
IS framework was designed to capture factors (including those at
he sectoral level) that inﬂuence the functional pattern of a speciﬁc
IS, it cannot be expected to identify the full range of sources of iner-
ia that destabilising functions need to address in a given sector or
egime. Our contribution is, therefore, to extend the TIS framework
o shed light on the functions needed not only for the support of
ew innovations but also for the destabilisation of existing regimes;
ur argument being that policy mixes need to explicitly attend to
oth processes in a mutually re-enforcing way. This complements
he recent papers that discussed innovation policy in the context
f socio-technical transitions (Alkemade et al., 2011; Weber and
ohracher, 2012; Meelen and Farla, 2013; Kivimaa and Virkamäki,
014).
The existing transitions literature acknowledges that gover-
ing sustainability transitions is a political project in which the
irection of travel and the means are often highly contested
Shove and Walker, 2007; Meadowcroft, 2009; Scrase and Smith,
009). Different governments engage with the challenges of accel-
rating sustainability transitions in quite different ways (Kern,
011) and not all policy recipes travel well to other political
ontexts (Heiskanen et al., 2009). Because “[c]hoices among alter-
ative technological pathways involve [political] struggles among
ival commercial groups.  . . And politics and governments are
nevitably preoccupied with managing the distributional fall out”olicy 45 (2016) 205–217 207
(Meadowcroft, 2011, p. 71), the resulting policy mixes are likely
to be political compromises. This point about the distributional
effects is particularly pertinent when discussing policy mixes for
the explicit destabilisation of regimes. While the politics behind
particular policy choices are an important part of socio-technical
transitions generally, this issue falls outside the core focus of this
paper as we will argue in Section 3.
2.3. Policy mixes for creative destruction?
The idea of sustainability transitions as being partly enabled
by the destabilisation of established socio-technical regimes (e.g.
Turnheim and Geels, 2013) links to the concept of creative destruc-
tion, as coined by Joseph Schumpeter. Creative destruction has been
conceptualised as a process, in which an innovative entrepreneur
challenges incumbent ﬁrms and technologies in a way that makes
the existing technologies obsolete, forcing incumbents to with-
draw from the market (Soete and ter Weel, 1999). At the heart of
the entrepreneurial action is disruptive and competence destroy-
ing innovation (Christensen, 1997; Tushman and Anderson, 1986)
that “changes the technology of process or product in a way that
imposes requirements that the existing resources, skills and knowl-
edge satisfy poorly or not at all. The effect is thus to reduce the
value of existing competence, and in the extreme case, to ren-
der it obsolete” (Abernathy and Clark, 1985, p. 6). However, critics
also point to empirical evidence which shows that, through pro-
cesses of creative accumulation, incumbents may be able to absorb
new technologies and integrate them within their existing capabil-
ities and thereby prevent the destruction of existing industries as a
consequence of discontinuous technological change (Bergek et al.,
2013). We  suggest that a similar kind of thinking as implied by ‘dis-
ruptive innovation’ could be applied to policy in that policies could
be disruptive in the institutional context shaking the regime in a
way that reduces the value of existing practices and technologies,
thereby creating momentum for transitions and maybe also incen-
tivising incumbents to play an active role in the transformation.
We argue that attention to the destruction side is particularly rele-
vant when alternative innovations have already developed some
momentum rather than being at a very early stage. We  further
specify this thinking by developing a novel analytical framework
in Section 3.1 extending the TIS functions approach.
3. Analytical framework and methodology
3.1. Analytical framework: policy mixes for sustainability
transitions through ‘creative destruction’
Building on the literature reviewed above, the focus of our
analytical framework is on policy instruments or measures target-
ing two  different types of processes that have been highlighted
to be of importance for sustainability transitions: the creation
of niche innovations including their development over time and
the destruction of incumbent regimes (Table 1). On the ‘creative’
side, we mainly use the existing TIS functions as a basis (Bergekand may, for example, hinder private R&D investments due to ‘free’ knowledge spill-
overs to other actors (e.g. Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). It is, however, not included
in  our analytical framework as it partly involves public R&D funding, which is well
covered in the categories for knowledge (C1) and resource mobilisation (C5) already.
Second, Bergek et al. (2008, p. 418) themselves argue that “[t]his function is thus
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Table  1
The analytical framework.
Potential innovation/system
inﬂuence of policy instrument
Basis in literature Description of policy instruments (inﬂuenced by
Kivimaa and Virkamäki, 2014)
Creative (niche support)
Knowledge creation,
development and
diffusion (C1)
Strengthening the knowledge base and how that
knowledge is developed, combined and diffused is a key
TIS function and a key process within the SNM literature
(learning). This implies not only R&D but support for
networks as network weaknesses can hinder knowledge
development (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). Different types
of  knowledge, e.g. scientiﬁc, technological, production,
market, logistics and design, and sources of knowledge,
e.g. R&D and learning, are included (Bergek et al., 2008).
R&D funding schemes, innovation platforms and other
policies aiming to increase knowledge creation and
diffusion through networks; subsidies for
demonstrations; educational policies, training
schemes, coordination of intellectual property rights,
reference guidelines for best available technology.
Establishing market
niches/market formation
(C2)
Strengthening market formation by creating new customer
demand, e.g. through institutional change, is also a TIS
function. It comprises niche markets, e.g. in the form of
demonstration projects, bridging markets and mass
markets (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). Also in SNM, niche
markets are considered important for the further
development of new socio-technical conﬁgurations
(Hoogma et al., 2002). They can be created through policy
action but also might pre-exist in the form of green
consumers who buy products with sustainability
credentials despite higher prices or lower performance
(Smith and Raven, 2012).
Regulation, tax exemptions, market-based policy
instruments such as certiﬁcate trading, feed-in tariffs,
public procurement, deployment subsidies, labelling.
Price-performance
improvements (C3)
According to the SNM literature, sustainable innovations
are often not competitive within normal selection
environments because their performance is weaker
compared to incumbent technologies (e.g. electric cars in
terms of range) and/or their price is higher (e.g. wind
compared to natural gas) (Schot and Geels, 2008). Through
achieving price-performance improvements, niches can
over time become competitive with incumbent
technologies and this process can be aided by policy (Kern,
2012). C1 and C2 also inﬂuence C3.
Deployment and demonstration subsidies enabling
learning-by-doing; R&D support (cost reductions
through learning).
Entrepreneurial
experimentation (C4)
In TIS, this involves the reduction of uncertainties as a
consequence of the testing of new technologies,
applications and markets to enable piloting, the creation of
new opportunities and learning (Bergek et al., 2008;
Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). It also involves support for
entrepreneurship, e.g. through innovative policy designs,
addressing partly the formation of new actors and
networks in SNM.
Policies stimulating entrepreneurship and
diversiﬁcation of existing ﬁrms, advice systems for
SMEs, incubators, low-interest company loans, venture
capital; relaxed regulatory conditions for
experimenting.
Resource mobilisation (C5) Mobilisation of human and ﬁnancial capital, and
complementary assets such as network infrastructure are
included in this TIS function (Bergek et al., 2008; Jacobsson
and Bergek, 2011).
Financial: R&D funding, deployment subsidies,
low-interest loans, venture capital.
Human: educational policies, labour-market policies,
secondment of expertise.
Support from powerful
groups/legitimation (C6)
“Legitimacy, i.e. social acceptance and compliance with
relevant institutions; is needed for many of the other
functions to work, e.g. for resources to be mobilized, for
markets to form and for actors to acquire political
strength. Legitimacy also inﬂuences expectations among
managers and, by implication, the function “inﬂuence on
the  direction of search”” (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011, p.
51). In SNM, shared positive expectations legitimate the
continuation of protecting and nurturing a niche (Schot
and Geels, 2008).
Innovation platforms, foresight exercises, public
procurement and labelling to create legitimacy for new
technologies, practices and visions.
Inﬂuence on the direction
of search (C7)
TIS deﬁnes this as incentives and/or pressures for
organisations to enter into the technological ﬁeld
inﬂuenced by visions and expectations articulated by
companies and in policies (e.g. Jacobsson and Bergek,
2011), by landscape changes, and by legitimisation (Bergek
et al., 2008). Links also the articulation of expectations and
visions in SNM (e.g. Smith and Raven, 2012). Conﬂicting
policy goals and instruments are likely to diminish this
inﬂuence.
Goals set and framing in strategies, targeted R&D
funding schemes, regulations, tax incentives, foresight
exercises, voluntary agreements.
Destruction (regime destabilisation)
Control policies (D1) The transition management literature argues that ‘control
policies’ are required to put pressure on the regime. For
example internalising the environmental costs of carbon
emissions is argued to be key to create an ‘extended level
playing ﬁeld’ for niches and incumbent technologies to
compete on fair terms (van den Bergh et al., 2006). Kemp
and  Rotmans argue that without such policies the fostering
of  niche innovations will not lead to transitions (Kemp and
Rotmans, 2004, p. 164).
Policies, such as taxes, import restrictions, and
regulations. Control policies, for example, may include
using carbon trading, pollution taxes or road pricing to
put economic pressure on current regimes. Banning
certain technologies is the strongest form of regulatory
pressure (e.g. phase out of ﬂuorescent light bulbs).
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Table  1 (Continued )
Potential innovation/system
inﬂuence of policy instrument
Basis in literature Description of policy instruments (inﬂuenced by
Kivimaa and Virkamäki, 2014)
Signiﬁcant changes in
regime rules (D2)
The ‘deep structure’ of socio-technical regimes consists of
semi-coherent set of rules directing and coordinating the
activities of the social groups reproducing the various
elements of socio-technical systems; one element of
destabilisation can be reconﬁguration in the institutional
rules which are favourable to the status quo/path
dependent evolution of the regime (Geels, 2011).
Particularly, radical policy reforms, where policies
substantially change economic frame conditions, may
accelerate destabilisation (Turnheim and Geels, 2012, p.
44).
Policies constituting, for example, structural reforms in
legislation or signiﬁcant new overarching laws.
Historic examples of major rule changes include the
privatisation and liberalisation of electricity markets in
the 1990s which completely changed the selection
environment within which utilities were operating.
Reduced support for
dominant regime
technologies (D3)
Support for incumbent technologies can become
institutionalised within the rules of the regimes which
make it difﬁcult for innovations to break through (Smith
and Raven, 2012). For example fossil fuel technologies are
heavily subsidised and “their removal would greatly
contribute to their destabilisation”(Turnheim and Geels,
2012, p. 48). Historical examples show that the loss of
support can have serious consequences (Turnheim and
Geels, 2012), and that radical innovation in technology
implies a changed balance between a process or a product
and existing resources (Abernathy and Clark, 1985).
Withdrawing support for selected technologies (e.g.
cutting R&D funding, removing subsidies for fossil fuel
production or removing tax deductions for private
motor transport).
Changes in social
networks, replacement
of key actors (D4)
Close relationships between government and key regime
actors is often seen as a major source of lock-in (Unruh,
2000; Walker, 2000). Regime destabilisation may  involve
replacement of incumbents by new actors (Turnheim and
Geels, 2012). Similarly creative destruction involves
replacing existing skill and knowledge (of actors) with new
ones (Abernathy and Clark, 1985). Deliberately breaking
up established actor-network structures or developing
different fora to bypass traditional policy networks could
niche 
d by tr
l., 200
Balancing involvement of incumbents for example in
policy advisory councils with niche actors (as
attempted in the Dutch energy transition programme
through the transition platforms) (Kern and Smith,
2008); formation of new organisations or networks to
take on tasks linked to system change.
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is one of the strategies recommende
management scholars (Rotmans et a
price-performance improvements’ as an additional category,
ecause the SNM literature argues that price-performance
mprovements are an important process that helps stabilise a niche
nd enables it to compete with incumbent technologies (Geels and
chot, 2007).
Our analytical categories on the ‘destruction’ side are developed
rawing particularly on the concepts of regime (e.g. Hoogma et al.,
002; Geels, 2010) and destabilisation (Turnheim and Geels, 2012,
013). We also link these to creative destruction and disruptive
nnovation (Abernathy and Clark, 1985) and some of the ideas of
ransition management (Rotmans et al., 2001; Kemp and Rotmans,
004).
What do we know about how existing regimes can be unsettled?
echnological regimes have been conceptualised to be about rules,
.e. the cognitive and normative framework connected to functional
elationships between technical components and actors (Hoogma
t al., 2002, p. 19). It is both the technology and the rules in the
egimes that have frequently been identiﬁed to be path dependent
nd, therefore, difﬁcult to change (Unruh, 2000; Pierson, 2004).
he struggle between niches (creation and development of the
ew) and regimes (stability of the old ‘dominant design’ (Anderson
nd Tushman, 1990)2 supported by incremental innovation (c.f.
ot independent but works through strengthening the other six functions”, which
s  why  we  focus on the other six functions.
2 The concept of ‘dominant design’ originated in the literature on technology
ycles, in which has been predominantly used in an industry context rather than
n  the context of (broader) socio-technical regimes. In this literature, technological
iscontinuities trigger a period of ferment – characterised by ‘substantial rivalry
etween alternative technological regimes’ – that ends in the emergence of a
ew dominant design; one example being the internal combustion engine used
n  powering automobiles. The dominant design is argued to lead a period of incre-
ental improvements and incorporate a technological regime that is more orderly.innovations and
ansition
1).
Abernathy and Clark, 1985)) has been argued to happen around
dimensions such as markets, regulations and infrastructure, and the
politics around them, and being enacted by various actors building
coalitions, when navigating transitions (Geels, 2010; Meadowcroft,
2011).
In the literature linked to creative destruction, the struggle has
been described to occur particularly after disruptive innovation
has emerged. The struggle is portrayed as competition between
old and new technical regimes during the ‘era of ferment’ which
happens until a new dominant design has emerged from competi-
tion between actors (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). The selection
of the new dominant design in turn leads to and is supported by
the build-up of standards and optimised organisational processes
around it (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). Thus, the concept of
regimes implies rules, technologies and actor-networks as the main
components that can enforce stability or, when they change, create
instability of the regime. Therefore, we  propose our regime desta-
bilising functions to be linked to changes in rules, technologies and
actor networks (drawing on Kern, 2012, and Verbong and Geels,
2007).
In our analytical framework (Table 1), rules are divided into two
functions: control policies implying efforts to control the environ-
mental impacts of the existing regime (D1) and signiﬁcant changes
in regime rules referring to structural reforms in legislation and sig-
niﬁcant new overarching laws that are not necessarily directly or
solely targeting environmental impacts (D2). The transition man-
agement literature has long argued that ‘control policies’ (D1), one
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990). We connect to these concepts here because, they
not  only build on the idea of creative destruction, but according to Anderson and
Tushman (1990, p. 606) the dominant design “technology could be examined at
several levels of analysis”.
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xample being the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, are required to
ut pressure on the regime. For example, internalising the envi-
onmental costs of carbon emissions is claimed to be crucial in
reating an ‘extended level playing ﬁeld’ for niches and incumbent
echnologies to compete on fair terms (van den Bergh et al., 2006).
emp and Rotmans (2004) argue that without such policies the
ostering of niche innovations will not lead to transitions. There is
ndeed much evidence to suggest that both niche support policies
nd policies to internalise externalities are required and that nei-
her of them is a good substitute for the other, see e.g. Newell (2010)
nd Popp (2006). However, a relatively high carbon tax would to
ome extent enable lower deployment subsidies to be effective than
ould otherwise be the case.
In addition to internalising externalities, it has been suggested
hat transitions require signiﬁcant changes to regime rules (D2)
n ways favourable to niches, because existing rules normally hin-
er path-breaking innovations (Smith and Raven, 2012). Turnheim
nd Geels (2012, 2013) argue that, as part of regime destabil-
sation, the ‘weakening reproduction of core regime elements’
s seen as necessary to create ‘windows of opportunity’ for the
pscaling of niche innovations. Particularly, radical policy reforms,
here policies substantially change economic frame conditions,
ay  accelerate destabilisation (Turnheim and Geels, 2012). Such
xamples are the UK electricity market reform which gave prior-
ty to low carbon electricity generation options (Kern et al., 2014)
nd the coal market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s showing that
industries can be deliberately destabilised” (Turnheim and Geels,
012, p. 48).
In terms of changes in technologies, creative destruction
hrough disruptive innovation involves processes by which
esources, skills and knowledge held by incumbents become obso-
ete; in an industrial context, implying that, for example, the value
f existing expertise and other factors of production reduce signif-
cantly (Abernathy and Clark, 1985). This is a rare event (Anderson
nd Tushman, 1990) as support for incumbent technologies is often
nstitutionalised within the rules of the regimes making it difﬁcult
or innovations to break through (Smith and Raven, 2012; Turnheim
nd Geels, 2012). Historical evidence shows that destabilisation
ormally entails weakening ﬂows of resources into the reproduc-
ion of regime elements including core technologies (Turnheim
nd Geels, 2013). For example fossil fuel technologies are heavily
ubsidised and “their removal would greatly contribute to their
estabilisation” (Turnheim and Geels, 2012, p. 48). Thus, policy
ixes for destabilisation may  involve weakening ﬂows of human
nd ﬁnancial resources to established technologies and practices
n the form of withdrawn subsidies or the shut-down of education
rogrammes for engineers focused on particular technologies (D3).
or example, in Germany, as part of the phase-out of nuclear power,
ederal research funding has been withdrawn from nuclear ﬁssion
esearch.
A core process within transitions is the entry of new play-
rs challenging established regime practices. People able to think
outside the box’ can make important contributions to radical
nnovation (Bower and Christensen, 1995) and policy processes
Christopoulos and Ingold, 2015). The interests that these ‘out-
iders’ have in existing systems tend to differ from the vested
nterests of incumbent actors, who carry more ‘sunk costs’ and
re consequently more tied to perpetuating the existing way of
oing things. Close relationships between the government and
ncumbent regime actors are often seen as a major source of lock-
n (Unruh, 2000; Walker, 2000). New entrants are more likely to
evelop radical innovations which, if successful, can disrupt and
isplace the mainstream way of doing things (e.g. Christensen,
997). Destabilisation at the level of actor-networks may  therefore
nvolve the replacement of incumbents with new entrants or the
eorientation of incumbents to new regimes (Turnheim and Geels,Fig. 1. Focus of analysis.
2012, p. 35). Deliberately breaking up established actor-network
structures or developing different fora to bypass traditional policy
networks is one of the strategies recommended by transition man-
agement scholars (e.g. Rotmans et al., 2001). From this we deduct
that previously dominant governance organisations or networks
may  be dismantled, replaced with new networks, merged or other-
wise altered, decreasing the legitimacy of and commitment to the
old regime (D4). An example is the Dutch energy transition pro-
gramme  which by setting up transition platforms explicitly tried to
bypass ‘normal’ policy making processes (Kern and Smith, 2008).
Alternatively, the setting up of systemic intermediaries (Kivimaa,
2014) could be regarded as an action aiming to change social
networks.
Overall, the proposed framework seeks to capture what we
see as two sides of the same coin: the creation and development
of innovations (C-functions) and the destruction of incumbent
regimes (D-functions). This analytical framework will be used to
empirically map  policy instruments to assess whether existing pol-
icy mixes have the potential to drive sustainability transitions. The
logic is to ascribe each instrument to contributing to one or more of
these ‘creative destruction’ processes to reveal whether or not the
existing policy mix  addresses the stipulated functions (C1–7 and
D1–4).
There is a close relationship between policy processes (including
their politics, the institutional contexts in which they are embed-
ded, etc.) and the resulting policy mixes, and their outcomes (Fig. 1).
The policy studies literature has much to say about the former (1)
and innovation economists have spent much time analysing the
latter (3). The focus of our analysis is on the overall characteristics
of the policy mix  (2). Policy design scholars argue that while it is
important to evaluate ex-post the impacts of policy instruments,
we can also assess ex-ante the likely outcome of policy mixes by
focussing on design criteria for effective policy mixes (Howlett and
Rayner, 2007, 2013). Howlett and Rayner (2013, p. 171) suggest that
policy mixes, if designed appropriately, can be expected “to have a
higher probability of delivering a speciﬁc outcome than some other
conﬁguration”. Coherence is often stipulated as one such design
criteria. Some studies have empirically looked at the coherence of
policy mixes for sustainability transitions (Kern and Howlett, 2009;
Huttunen et al., 2014). Building on this literature and the work on
transitions more widely, we suggest that policy mixes aimed at
stimulating transitions, in addition to general criteria such as coher-
ence, need to include elements of ‘creative destruction’ (Table 1) to
have better chances to succeed. Our framework is therefore hoped
to provide ex ante guidance to policy makers on more effective
policy mixes for achieving transitions.
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.2. Methodology
The empirical illustration of the utility of the framework focuses
n national-level policies including national implementation of EU
egislation. Even though local or regional initiatives also inﬂuence
ransition processes (e.g. Hodson and Marvin, 2010, 2012), they
re beyond the scope of this paper.3 Our analysis is limited to
hree regimes – mobility, electricity and heating of buildings –
hich cut across policy domains such as innovation, energy, ﬁs-
al and transport policy in two different countries: Finland and the
K. We  look for mixes of policies supporting transition processes
nd, thus, deﬁne policy mixes, extending from Borrás and Edquist
2013) as the speciﬁc combinations of policy instruments which
nteract explicitly or implicitly in fostering (in our illustration,
ow-energy) innovations and disrupting dominant (high-energy)
egimes.4 We  examine instruments inﬂuencing innovation related
o energy demand reduction and improved energy efﬁciency; thus,
or example renewable energy policies focussing merely on the
upply side (e.g. wind power, biofuels) are outside the scope of our
nalysis.
The research method used is a policy mapping exercise. By
sing four international data sources of policy measures, to enable
he collection of comparable data for both countries, lists of rele-
ant policies potentially inﬂuencing low energy transitions were
dentiﬁed in September and October 2013. The following sources
ere used: The International Energy Agency’s reviews of energy
olicies in the UK (IEA, 2012) and Finland (IEA, 2013) and the
EA policies and measures databases on energy efﬁciency (http://
ww.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/), the European Environmen-
al Agency’s database on climate change mitigation policies and
easures in Europe (www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/pam/),
he European Commission’s Erawatch research and innovation pol-
cy database (http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu/erawatch/opencms/
 and the IEA Sustainable Buildings Centre’s Building Energy Efﬁ-
iency Policies (BEEP) database (www.sustainablebuildingscentre.
rg/pages/beep).5 Information on the identiﬁed policy instruments
as complemented by searches made on both countries’ govern-
ental websites to ﬁnd out the objectives, justiﬁcations and main
ontent of the policy instruments, and complement the analyses to
dentify new organisations and networks. The draft lists of policy
nstruments were sent to four experts from policy and academia in
ach country, of which two replied per country, to validate the list
nd to check possible major omissions. We  initially identiﬁed 70
nstruments in the UK and 58 in Finland and added seven Finnish
nstruments and three UK instruments through the expert review
rocess.
The identiﬁed policy instruments were divided into groups
ased on their target regime: mobility, heating in buildings and
lectricity. Many policy instruments contributed across these sec-
ors and were categorised as generic innovation policy or energy
nd climate policy instruments. The instruments that linked across
ectors were also often instruments that did not only deal with
nergy efﬁciency but also energy supply – making drawing explicit
oundaries between energy efﬁciency and other energy policy
nstruments difﬁcult. Subsequently the policy instruments were
oded in Excel based on the analytical framework categories.
nvestigator triangulation was used in that both authors coded
3 The existing databases used for the analysis unfortunately only cover national
evel instruments.
4 While in terms of empirical illustration, we focus on instrument mixes, we see
he usability of our proposed framework also in examining in more detail mixes
f policy goals, instruments, and processes and how they in combination inﬂuence
ransitions. However, such a wider analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
5 No equivalent database exists for transport policies but the other sources cover
any transport-related policies.olicy 45 (2016) 205–217 211
independently, after which the results were compared. In case of
differing opinions, the ﬁnal coding was  negotiated between the
authors to ensure consistency.
The aim of the mapping exercise was to analyse how current
policy mixes engage or do not engage with processes argued to be
crucial for low energy transitions. Particular consideration was paid
to the relative attention these policy mixes placed on creation vs.
destruction, the relative coverage of the different regimes in terms
of number of instruments, and any important gaps. The purpose
here was  to look at how existing policy mixes ﬁll in all the functions.
While we  do demonstrate the number of instruments per function,
we want to emphasise that the inﬂuence of instruments in each
function is more relevant than the number of instruments. Yet a
low number of instruments in a given function can be used as an
indication of an area were further analysis of inﬂuence placed by
policies on the function is needed.
3.3. Empirical cases: low-energy transitions policy in Finland and
the UK
Empirically, the analysis focuses on low-energy innovations
which we  deﬁne as innovations reducing the demand for energy
and/or increasing energy efﬁciency. Such innovations include more
energy efﬁcient technologies, such as LED lighting or new building
designs, but they might also include social (e.g. car clubs, tele-
working) or organisational (e.g. new business models providing
energy services) innovations. Our focus complements the existing
literature on energy innovation which mostly deals with energy
supply (e.g. Foxon et al., 2005; Klaassen et al., 2005). Practices
for energy saving and demand have gained some interest recently
(Breukers et al., 2013; Heiskanen et al., 2013), while this is a new
topic for innovation policy analysis.
Finland and the UK were chosen as case countries as their recent
progress in energy efﬁciency shows differing trends based on an EU
wide survey. While the UK was found to have a clear strategy for
improving energy efﬁciency, policy progress in the last three years
was ranked from low to moderate; in turn, Finland was ranked
among the top three countries in terms of progress in energy efﬁ-
ciency policy (Energy Efﬁciency Watch, 2013). The countries also
differ in terms of their energy use proﬁles, the UK having one of
the lowest energy use per GDP among the IEA countries (IEA, 2012)
while Finland has one of the highest (IEA, 2013). In Finland, indus-
try is the largest energy user with nearly half of the total, while in
the UK buildings take up the majority of energy use. Furthermore,
the countries differ radically in terms of population size and den-
sity. Thus, the two  countries provide contrasting settings for testing
the conceptual framework. In Section 4, the empirical mapping
is brieﬂy presented, ﬁrst, giving an overview and, then, covering
destabilising functions in more detail as this is where we claim the
added value of our framework.
4. Low energy policy mixes in Finland and the UK
4.1. The low-energy policy mix in Finland
With one third of the country being located above the Arctic
circle and given its energy intensive industry (incl. pulp and paper,
chemicals, metals, electronics) Finland has the highest energy use
per capita of all IEA countries (IEA, 2013). The industrial sector is
the largest energy user (47.5% of total ﬁnal use), followed by the
residential sector (20%), while the commercial and other service
sectors accounted for 15.3% in 2011. Transport accounted only for
17.2%; the lowest percentage among IEA member countries. The
Finnish building stock is very efﬁcient and makes extensive use of
212 P. Kivimaa, F. Kern / Research Policy 45 (2016) 205–217
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istrict heating, 75% of which is provided by combined heat and
ower plants.
Our analysis of the Finnish policy mix  shows a wide range
f instruments targeted at different energy regimes that in
ombination inﬂuence all niche supporting and regime desta-
ilising functions. However, very few instruments address
rice-performance improvements (C3) and the destabilising func-
ions (Fig. 2). A multitude of policy instruments inﬂuencing
obility and the heating of buildings are in force, while electricity
se is somewhat less targeted.
A gap in the policy mix  exists for transport, heating of buildings
nd electricity regimes regarding ‘entrepreneurial experimenta-
ion’ (C4), which is left to be addressed by generic innovation and
limate and energy policies (such as Finnvera’s ﬁnancial services
or start-ups and micro-enterprises and energy efﬁciency guide-
ines for public procurement).6 For example, the energy aid scheme
rovides subsidies on a discretionary basis on investment projects
hat “promote energy conservation or improve the efﬁciency of
nergy production or use”. This policy coupled with electricity tax
ncreases (linked to market formation C2, inﬂuence on the direction
f search C7, control policies D1) and energy performance require-
ents for new buildings (contributing to market formation C2,
rice-performance improvements C3, direction of search C7, and
ontrol policies D1) could at the same time destabilise the existing
egime, contribute to a transition towards zero energy buildings
nd create niche-innovations for energy saving solutions in con-
truction. Yet, there is no guarantee that resources in connection to
eneric innovation support will actually be allocated for the pur-
ose of supporting energy demand reduction or efﬁciency.
In total we found nine control policies (D1), one signiﬁcant
hange in regime rules (D2), four policies representing the removal
f support for dominant technologies (D3), and one change in actor-
etworks (D4). The regime-speciﬁc control policies ranged from
nvironmental amendments in tax regimes (for vehicles, transport
uels, electricity, natural gas and heating) to performance stan-
ards and regulations for new cars and buildings. Three of the D1
olicies concerned mobility, four concerned electricity and heat-
ng, and two were more generic climate policies, such as the EU
6 A previous study on mobility-related policies noted a lack of signiﬁcant national-
evel instruments related to ‘entrepreneurial experimentation’ (C4) and ‘market
ormation’ (C2) (Kivimaa and Virkamäki, 2014).ergy’ policy mix.
Emissions Trading Scheme. For example, the National Building Code
sets requirements for the energy use of Finland’s building stock
in accordance with the EU Directive on the Energy Performance
of Buildings. The 2012 revision pushes Finland’s already stringent
energy performance requirements up by a further 30%, and now
also takes into account the energy source of the building.
We interpreted a recent revision in the Land Use and Building
Act, inﬂuencing energy use across regimes, as a signiﬁcant change
in regime rules (D2). The revised Act aims to ensure energy efﬁ-
ciency and resource efﬁciency in the renovation of buildings and to
avoid disruptive land use development and increased transporta-
tion needs speciﬁcally by limiting the construction of retail centres
based on private car transportation. Its signiﬁcance is based on the
expansion of support for energy efﬁciency through the Act and the
strengthening of the instruments of the law (for example, by pro-
viding mandates to municipalities to make obligations linked to
reduced energy use).
Amendment of the fuel tax to be based on the energy content
of the fuel and an increased tax level for fossil fuel based heating
were considered as removal of support for dominant technologies
(D3) as was the EU wide ban on incandescent light bulbs. Fuel tax
in general reduces support for high-energy consuming vehicles and
practices and, when taking into account the energy content of the
fuel, this effect is intensiﬁed to support the most efﬁcient fuels. At
the same time, the attempts to signiﬁcantly reduce the tax break
for work-based travel, increasing transport energy use, have failed
due to political difﬁculties.
No signiﬁcant changes in policy networks or key actors (D4)
were identiﬁed in policy instrument databases but the other
sources revealed a potential new destabilising actor in the energy
regime. Inspired by a group of distinguished professors publishing a
report on the need for new energy policy, an action focused network
was established based on open engagement with a variety of actors
from associations to a range of small and larger companies. The net-
work aimed to lift energy policy as one of the most important goals
for the new government resulting from spring 2015 elections and
bring resource use as its focus.
Overall, the Finnish policy mix  demonstrates an imbalance
between creation and destabilisation policies, not only as numbers
of instruments, but also in terms of content, particularly linking to
signiﬁcant changes in regime rules and changes in ofﬁcial policy
networks and actors. The large number of policies inﬂuencing the
low energy ﬁeld in general may, in turn, create increased likelihood
P. Kivimaa, F. Kern / Research Policy 45 (2016) 205–217 213
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or inconsistencies due to the layering of policies. More attention is
eeded on how the multiple policies crossing regimes and domains
nﬂuence transitions.
.2. The low-energy policy mix in the UK
The largest end-use of energy in the UK occurs in the residential
ector, amounting to 32% of total ﬁnal use, followed by transport
ith 30%, industry with 25% and commercial and other sectors with
3% in 2010. According to the IEA (2012, p. 13), “[e]nergy use per
nit of GDP in the United Kingdom is one of the lowest among the
EA member countries, reﬂecting both the large share of services
nd the small share of energy-intensive industry in the economy,
ut also improvements in energy efﬁciency”.
Our analysis of the UK policy mix  shows a wide range of instru-
ents targeted at different energy regimes that in combination
nﬂuence all niche supporting functions and regime destabilising
unctions (Fig. 3). However, as in the Finnish case, very few instru-
ents address price-performance improvements (C3) and the
estabilising functions (D1–4). A multitude of policy instruments
nﬂuencing mobility and the heating of buildings are in force, while
lectricity use on its own is somewhat less targeted. However, sev-
ral instruments address electricity and heating simultaneously.
The UK has recently introduced several policy instruments inﬂu-
ncing energy efﬁciency and energy demand in the heating of
uildings and mobility. Both sectors present fairly comprehensive
olicy mixes from the perspective of niche support with only legit-
mising instruments (C6) missing for mobility. However, many of
he mobility policies (at least at the national level) focus speciﬁcally
n automobility (such as car tax reforms, programmes for electric
obility, fuel economy labels, the Low Carbon Vehicle Partnership)
ather than alternative mobility systems (cycling, walking, public
ransport) (see Supplementary data). Many of such initiatives are
appening at the city or local level (e.g. congestion charging in Lon-
on, city bike schemes, car clubs).7 Less focus in terms of energy
fﬁciency measures has been placed on the electricity sector that
s dominated by supply side instruments trying to stimulate the
ptake of renewable energy technologies, nuclear and CCS.
7 Expert review comment.y’ policy mix.
As in the Finnish case, a gap in the policy mixes for the heating of
buildings and electricity regimes exists regarding ‘entrepreneurial
experimentation’ (C4), which is mainly left to be addressed by
generic innovation and climate and energy policies (with the
exception of the Carbon Trust which fosters ‘entrepreneurial exper-
imentation’ (C4) for example through an incubation scheme for low
carbon businesses).
Similarly to Finland, few policy instruments were found to con-
tribute to the destabilisation of existing regimes (D1–4). In total,
we identiﬁed 16 instruments as ‘control policies’ (D1), one signif-
icant change in regime rules (D2), one policy removing support
for established technologies (D3) and one new actor (D4). As in
Finland, control policies included minimum performance standards
for new passenger cars and buildings, changes in taxation (e.g. com-
pany car tax reform, fuel duty escalator) and the Emissions Trading
Scheme. In addition, the UK had a range of policy instruments and
packages – differing from Finland – as further control policies: a
requirement of private landlords to make reasonable energy efﬁ-
ciency improvements required by tenants, the Climate Change Levy
on energy for lighting, heating and power aimed at encouraging
energy efﬁciency in businesses, the Carbon Price Floor as part of
the electricity market reform, and the Government Buying Stan-
dards. All these instruments put economic or regulatory pressure
on existing regime practices. For example, the Carbon Price Floor,
by ensuring a minimum price of carbon, aims to reduce the use of
carbon intensive fossil fuels and to address the weakness of the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme.
Our UK analysis identiﬁed one policy instrument deemed to
directly address signiﬁcant changes in regime rules (D2): the 2008
Climate Change Act. The act aims for a 50% reduction in green-
house gas emissions from 1990 to 2027 and a reduction of 80%
by 2050. According to the Act, a system of “carbon budgets” limits
UK emissions over successive ﬁve-year periods and sets the tra-
jectory to 2050. Most emphasis has so far been put on change
within the electricity regime (e.g. with regard to the roll-out of
low carbon generation) but the recent electricity market reform
introduces a number of instruments putting pressure on fossil fuel
plant operators. The reform mainly deals with energy supply rather
than energy use or energy-efﬁciency but, for example, capacity pay-
ments have been introduced to ensure sufﬁcient system ﬂexibility
to maintain reliable supplies, and will also involve demand-side
response issues.
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The only instrument we identiﬁed as being directly targeted
t withdrawing support for a dominant regime technology (D3)
as the EU ban of incandescent light bulbs introduced in 2012.
he EU ban aimed to increase the energy efﬁciency of lighting and
ent a strong signal to manufacturers and consumers by using the
ost draconian policy measure available: an outright ban. This is
he most extreme form of withdrawing support for a technology
hich has been dominating domestic lighting practices for more
han a century. Potentially such an instrument, in combination with
ther instruments such as the national products policy (legislation
o set minimum energy efﬁciency standards for products on sale
nd mandating energy efﬁciency labelling of appliances), also has
 signalling effect for manufacturers of other highly-energy inefﬁ-
ient products.
The Climate Change Committee (CCC) set up to oversee the exe-
ution of the Climate Change Act represents a change in key actors
D4). The CCC independently advises the governments on the car-
on budgets required to meet the long term targets enshrined in
he act, advises on policy actions to reduce emissions, and measures
rogress against the targets. As such the CCC has become an inﬂu-
ntial body within UK energy and climate policy and there have
een several instances of conﬂicts (e.g. around the fourth carbon
udget) between the government and the advice of the CCC but so
ar the CCC has prevailed.
Overall, as in the Finnish case, there is an imbalance between
reative and destructive policies, but there is a slightly larger focus
n the UK on destabilising policies than in Finland (a wider range
f control policies being used). Especially, the Carbon Price Floor is
rincipally able to contribute to the destabilisation of high energy
egimes, but much depends on its future setting (e.g. planned
ncreases were recently frozen). Signiﬁcant policy attention has
een devoted to low energy innovation in the UK, and several new
olicy instruments were added to the existing mix, which suggests
n increased likelihood for inconsistencies because of layering of
olicies. The government is aware of this challenge and has com-
issioned a report (Opportunities for integrating demand side energy
olicies) which concluded that there is a wide range of government
rogrammes supporting energy efﬁciency and distributed energy
olutions but that a lack of integration could cause policies to com-
ete or undermine each other’s effectiveness.
. Discussion
The empirical analysis showed that the framework developed
n this paper – combining seven niche support (creative) func-
ions with four regime destabilising (destruction) functions – can
eveal interesting lessons about policy mixes for sustainability tran-
itions. We  suggest that policy mixes which cover both dimensions
f ‘creative destruction’ are more likely to achieve transitions. Inter-
stingly, both countries show largely similar policy mix  proﬁles
demonstrated in Figs. 2 and 3), while the mix  of UK policies for
destruction’ appears more innovative and extensive.
As expected we found fewer policy instruments directly tack-
ing regime destabilisation (D-functions) than niche support
C-functions). Relatively many control policies (D1) were found
n both countries that simultaneously also inﬂuenced market for-
ation (C2) and/or the direction of search (C7). Some UK D1
nstruments also inﬂuenced knowledge creation and diffusion (C1)
nd resource mobilisation (C5).
We found two examples of signiﬁcant changes in regime rules
D2): the revision of the Land Use and Building Act in Finland
nd the Climate Change Act in the UK. The rarity of this function
an probably be explained by the political hostility towards struc-
ural change and the difﬁculties to politically sustain it (Lockwood,
013).olicy 45 (2016) 205–217
We  identiﬁed only a few changes in support for dominant tech-
nologies (D3) directly applicable to the reduction of energy demand
or improvement of energy efﬁciency, such as the EU-wide ban on
incandescent light bulbs and the amendment of transport fuel tax-
ation in Finland. However, indirectly, the removal of support for
fossil fuels is a measure destabilising the high-energy regime and
has clear implications: reduced support for fossil fuel exploration
and production may  increase energy prices and, thereby, increase
incentives for low energy innovations. In the UK, several such meas-
ures have been taken, for example, the removal of subsidies for coal
mine operating costs, in 2002, and for maintaining access to already
exploited coal reserves in 2008 (IEA, 2012, p. 93). What the exam-
ples of selected destabilising policies may  also indicate is that not
so many destabilising policies may  be necessary, as long as they
exist in a form able to disrupt the regime.
Destabilisation policies are politically difﬁcult. That we ﬁnd
few examples of such policies is therefore not surprising. In a
general sense the development of energy policy mixes in both
countries probably represent what Howlett and Rayner (2007)
would classify as layering, while destabilising policies–particularly
those addressing reduced support for dominant regime technolo-
gies, replacement of key actors, or signiﬁcant changes in rules
would require a replacement (Kern and Howlett, 2009) approach.
Jänicke and Jacob (2005) have argued that necessary structural
change from an environmental perspective, such as the phasing
out of nuclear energy or the use of lignite coal, requires huge
political endeavour and is therefore possible only in exceptional
circumstances. Also Meadowcroft (2005, 2011) has made a simi-
lar point. Moreover, designing policies attempting to undermine
existing regimes is challenging, because they present a contradic-
tory ideology to that of traditional innovation policies, often aimed
to contribute to economic growth (e.g. Alkemade et al., 2011), and
because they are likely to require signiﬁcant backing of major polit-
ical parties (e.g. Strunz, 2014).
However, there are a number of arguments policymakers can
use to justify destructive policies: one is that destabilising existing
regimes is one way of achieving more effective competition (in the
sense of ‘levelling the playing ﬁeld’). A second justiﬁcation might
be that such policies are required to free Keynes’s ‘animal spirits’
necessary for radical entrepreneurship and its effects in terms of
‘creative destruction’. Yet even in the event of political backing for
restructuring policy mixes in a given domain, such as energy or
innovation, the creation of new policy designs requires a sophisti-
cated analysis of policy dynamics and instrument choice (Howlett
and Rayner, 2007), while still facing the risk of sub-optimal policy
mixes (Kern and Howlett, 2009) particularly when confronted with
policy instruments designed for completely different purposes.
Our empirics also point to connections within policy mixes.
Whereas the discussion on the synergies and contradictions (cf.
Nilsson et al., 2012; Rogge and Reichardt, 2013) or cumulative cau-
sation (cf. Suurs and Hekkert, 2009) between the elements of this
framework cannot be addressed here in detail, some observations
on the links between creative and destructive policies can be made.
Control policies (D1) have a clear dual function in destabilising the
current regime, often by controlling the environmental impacts,
while at the same time supporting niche development through cre-
ating markets for niche innovations (C2), in effect contributing to
multiple “motors” (see Section 2.2) at the same time. The EU Direc-
tives on Emissions Trading or the Energy Performance Standards
for buildings are good examples.
Less directly, knowledge creation, development and diffusion
(C1) and resource mobilisation (C5) might be linked to the removal
of support for established technologies (D3) in that re-directing
research funding, education and science to certain areas simulta-
neously may  promote niches and withdraw support from estab-
lished technologies. This means that a mix  of policy instruments
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ould both contribute to the Science and Technology Push (STP)
otor of a new TIS and diminish the STP motor of the dominant
egime simultaneously. In that sense it seems useful to expand the
oncept of ‘motors of innovation’ to ‘motors of creative destruc-
ion’. We  argue that while the cumulative build-up of various
nnovation system functions (here covered through the niche sup-
ort functions) is necessary, on its own it is insufﬁcient to drive
igniﬁcant sustainability transitions, especially given the urgency
f the required transitions. Therefore, the cumulative effects and
ynamics of both niche support and regime destruction processes
hould be at the centre of attention. Further analysis of these links
 particularly those linking signiﬁcant changes in regime rules (D2)
nd changes in networks and replacement of key actors (D4) with
mpacts on niche support functions (C1–7) – would need more
etailed case studies with a more limited scope of policies than
nalysed in this paper.
Our empirical analysis also points to a need for further concep-
ual and methodological developments. The placing of instruments
nto functions was sometimes difﬁcult and more speciﬁc indicators
or each function are needed – particularly on how to interpret the
unctions ‘legitimation’ and ‘price-performance improvements’.
his further deﬁnition of functions is necessary to analyse the
ffects of policy mixes but is likely to require further empirical
tudies on destabilising policies and how their effects unfold to
rovide insights into the actual content and nature of destabilising
unctions and the resulting new governance arrangements.
Often policy instruments can be interpreted to be contribut-
ng to speciﬁc functions or not depending on how narrow or wide
he interpretation of the function is. For example, in terms of
esource mobilisation (C5) a policy instrument can directly provide
esources (e.g. by setting up a public fund for R&D on energy efﬁ-
iency) or indirectly stimulate the mobilisation of resources by
ther actors (e.g. by setting vehicle emission standards leading to
tronger R&D efforts by car manufacturers or by establishing a pres-
igious energy efﬁciency award which might stimulate investment
y private actors). This is not only a problem of classiﬁcation but
lso inﬂuences the potential effect of policies. Interpreting func-
ions in a narrow way enables better identiﬁcation of potential
olicy gaps to be analysed in more detail when observed.
. Conclusions
Our aim was to broaden the discussion within the technology
nd innovation studies literature about the importance of policy
ixes. We  argued that policy mixes are particularly important
nd challenging, if policy is aimed not just at the creation or dif-
usion of innovations but at transforming entire socio-technical
ystems towards sustainability. Drawing on the existing policy mix
nd sustainability transitions literatures, the contribution of this
aper was to explicitly conceptualise policy mixes for sustainability
ransitions. Our key argument was that policy mixes for sustaina-
ility transitions should incorporate instruments addressing two
imensions: those aimed at creating niche-innovations and build-
ng effective innovation systems around them, and those aimed
t destabilising currently dominant regimes creating openings for
 speedier take-off and sustained growth of niche innovations to
eplace incumbent (high energy) technologies. We  therefore pro-
ose to expand to concept of ‘motors of innovation’ to ‘motors of
reative destruction’ to incorporate attention to the required desta-
ilisation processes of incumbent regimes.
We speciﬁcally built on the Technological Innovation System
TIS) functions and Strategic Niche Management for developing
iche support functions, while for the destabilisation functions we
tilised Schumpeter’s seminal concept of ‘creative destruction’, the
oncept of regime destabilisation by Turnheim and Geels (2012,
013) and some ideas of transition management (Rotmans et al.,olicy 45 (2016) 205–217 215
2001). By initiating a discussion on policies destabilising current
regimes, we wish to facilitate further analyses of policy mixes going
beyond stimulating individual technologies as in much of the exist-
ing TIS literature.
We argue that the conceptual framework and the analy-
sis presented in this paper are a ﬁrst step towards examining
policy mixes from the perspective of sustainability transitions.
Empirically, we  have provided an overview of which pro-
cesses are targeted by existing policy mixes in the UK and
Finnish low-energy transitions and have identiﬁed some impor-
tant gaps, particularly the lack of destabilising policies generally
as well as sector- and technology speciﬁc policies addressing
price-performance improvements and entrepreneurial experimen-
tation. Given these gaps in the current policy mix  designs,
more attention should be placed by policymakers on whether
the current policy mixes are sufﬁcient to achieve the ambi-
tious long-term targets for energy efﬁciency and energy demand
reduction. Conceptually, we  have developed an extension of
the TIS functions approach, by adding four regime destabilisa-
tion functions (D1: control policies, D2: signiﬁcant changes in
regime rules, D3: reduction in support for dominant technolo-
gies, and D4: changes in social networks and replacement of key
actors), and tested the framework against two case studies which
emphasised the need for further conceptual and methodological
reﬁnements.
Admittedly, the approach presented in the paper is a very proxy
way of analysing policy mixes and necessarily quite crude. One
shortcoming of the kind of analysis conducted here is that, while
we see a variety of instruments aimed at energy demand reduc-
tion, little can be said about their actual effectiveness. A more
detailed analysis of a limited set of instruments, their develop-
ment over time and their impact on the strategies of target groups
should be conducted to build on and complement our overview. In
more detailed analyses, interviews with target group actors could
shed light on how actors interpret the signals they receive from
different policy instruments (cf. Huttunen et al., 2014) and how
this shapes their strategies. Alternatively, econometric techniques
could be used to assess the combined impact of policy mixes. While
these kinds of studies have been carried out, so far they have not
extended to examining the impacts from the perspective of creative
destruction for sustainability transitions.
We  argue that the type of analysis carried out in this paper is
also of use for policymakers. Importantly, it shows that the mix of
generic innovation policies and targeted sectoral (and technology-
speciﬁc) policies is important to create more complete policy
mixes from the perspective of transitions – following Weber and
Rohracher’s (2012) call for a combination of ‘structural innovation
policies’ and ‘transformation-oriented innovation policies’. Apply-
ing the concept of ‘creative destruction’ in the context of public
policy will hopefully help to expand innovation policy debates to
go beyond policy mixes consisting of technology push and demand
pull instruments, and to consider a wider range of policy instru-
ments which may  contribute to both the creation and development
of niches as well the destabilisation of existing regimes.
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